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UNITED STATES V. LANGFORD
(decided December 31, 2002)
AMY GARZON*
I. INTRODUCTION
A factor in determining if a search is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment is whether police officers knock and announce
their presence before forcibly entering a home to execute a search
warrant.1  If police officers do not knock and announce their pres-
ence, any evidence obtained in the search may be rendered inad-
missible at trial.2  In United States v. Langford, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that when po-
lice officers conducted a search of a home pursuant to a warrant
without first knocking and announcing their presence, the evi-
dence obtained was not inadmissible at trial.3  The court reached
this result by expanding the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule.4  Traditionally, when applying the inevitable dis-
covery exception, courts look to whether the evidence obtained in
violation of the knock and announce rule inevitably would have
been discovered in a separate, untainted investigation.5 Langford,
however, applied the exception to the same investigation, reasoning
that if police are executing a warrant, discovery of evidence inside
the house is inevitable.6 Langford effectively nullifies any require-
ment to have police knock and announce their presence before ex-
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2004.  The author wishes to thank Pro-
fessor Tanina Rostain for her guidance, encouragement, and invaluable feedback.  The
author would also like to thank Professor Sadiq Reza and Professor Donald H. Zeigler
for their insight, comments, and suggestions.  Finally, the author would like to extend
her appreciation to Melissa O’Neill and Orit Tulchinsky for their exceptional editorial
work.
1. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
2. See sources cited infra note 25.
3. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002).
4. Id.
5. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2000).
6. Langford, 314 F.3d at 894-95.
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354 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
ecuting a warrant.  Without a remedy for violating that right, police
officers have less incentive to honor it.
This comment will argue that United States v. Langford was
wrongly decided.  The Seventh Circuit should return to the tradi-
tional standard: evidence obtained in violation of the knock and
announce rule should be admissible only if a second, separate in-
vestigation would likely have uncovered the evidence.7  The tradi-
tional standard preserves the policies underlying the knock and
announce rule, which include decreasing the potential for violent
encounters between police officers and the occupants of a home,
lessening the risk of needless private property damage, and protect-
ing occupants’ privacy rights.8
Part I of this Comment describes the evolution of the knock
and announce rule and the policy reasons underlying it.  Part I also
discusses the independent source and inevitable discovery excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule.  Part II describes the Langford deci-
sion.  Part III explains why Langford essentially repeals the knock
and announce rule, thereby undermining the important policies
served by it.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE RULE,
AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”9  In deter-
mining the scope of this right, courts often look to the common law
at the time the Constitution was framed.10  For example, in Wilson
v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court examined the common law to de-
termine whether the Fourth Amendment required police officers
7. Dice, 200 F.3d at 986.
8. Id. at 982.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).  In Wilson, the defendant filed a
motion to suppress evidence seized during a search asserting that the search was invalid
because, among other things, the officers failed to “knock and announce” before enter-
ing her home.  The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction on appeal
rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to
knock and announce prior to entering the residence. The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that “[the] common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part
of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 930.
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to knock and announce their presence before entering a home pur-
suant to a warrant.11  Several English cases had established the gen-
eral principle that an officer may enter a person’s house if he first
requests admission and informs the occupant of his purpose.12  The
Court noted that most states adopted the knock and announce
principle early on in both court decisions and statutes.13  Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court held that the knock and announce
rule is one of several factors considered in assessing the reasonable-
ness of a search or seizure.14  The Court specifically held that
“[g]iven the longstanding common-law endorsement of the prac-
tice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry
into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing
the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”15
Several important policies are furthered by the knock and an-
nounce rule.  First, if police officers do not knock and announce
their presence the potential for violent encounters between police
officers and occupants of a home are increased because the occu-
pants might react violently when faced with an intruder.16  The
practice also curbs the needless destruction of private property be-
cause police officers can avoid forcibly entering a home if they
knock and announce their presence.17  Finally, the rule protects an
individual’s right to privacy in his or her home.18
In Wilson, the Supreme Court stated that the knock and an-
nounce rule should not be rigidly applied.19  The Court recognized
that police officers may enter a home without knocking and an-
11. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 932-33.  (“The common-law knock and announce principle was woven
quickly into the fabric of early American law.  Most of the States that ratified the Fourth
Amendment had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes generally incorporating
English common law”).
14. Id. at 934.
15. Id. The constitutional standard articulated in Wilson is codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109 (2004).
16. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 2000); see also United States
v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 2000).
17. Dice, 200 F.3d at 982.
18. Id.
19. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.  This view conforms to the conventional totality of the
circumstances analysis applied under the Fourth Amendment.
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nouncing their presence if doing so would trump other interests.20
For example, an “unannounced entry may be justified where police
officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be de-
stroyed if advance notice were given.”21  Consequently, there are
three main exceptions to the knock and announce rule.22  Police
officers need not knock and announce their presence if the occu-
pants already know the police are there, if the police reasonably
believe someone in the house faces imminent bodily harm, or if the
police believe evidence is about to be destroyed.23  However, absent
the above mentioned exigent circumstances, police officers must
knock, announce their presence, and give the occupants a reasona-
ble time to respond before entering and searching a dwelling to
ensure that the fruits of the search will be admitted into evidence.24
Assuming none of the exceptions to the knock and announce
rule apply, the remedy for violating the knock and announce rule is
the exclusionary rule,25 which bars the use of unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence.26  In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that admitting the fruits of an illegal search or seizure would
render the Fourth Amendment meaningless.27  In Mapp v. Ohio, the
Court stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
violations and compel respect for the Fourth Amendment.28  In Nix
20. See id. at 935.
21. Id. at 936.
22. Id.; Dice, 200 F.3d at 983.
23. Dice, 200 F.3d at 986.
24. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-32.
25. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) (holding that evidence
should not have been admitted at trial because it was obtained in violation of the knock
and announce rule); United States v. Watson, 63 Fed. Appx. 216 (6th Cir.) (holding
that the “no-knock” entry into defendant’s apartment was not justified, and that evi-
dence seized during the ensuing search must be suppressed); United States v. Gallegos,
314 F.3d 456 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of the knock
and announce rule should be suppressed); United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383
(10th Cir. 1986) (holding that if the record clearly established that the officers failed to
knock and announce before forcibly entering the dwelling, and that no exigent circum-
stances were shown, the evidence seized must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful
search).
26. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
27. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 (stating that admitting illegally obtained evidence effec-
tively validates Fourth Amendment violations).
28. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)).
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v. Williams, the Supreme Court noted that the exclusionary rule can
be socially costly because criminals may avoid conviction, but that
the rule is nevertheless needed to deter police from violating the
Fourth Amendment.29  The Court also stated that the exclusionary
rule is necessary to prevent the government from benefiting from
Fourth Amendment violations.30  Accordingly, courts typically hold
that evidence obtained in violation of the knock and announce rule
is inadmissible against criminal defendants.31
There are exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the
independent source exception and the inevitable discovery excep-
tion.32  Similar policy considerations underlie these two exceptions.
However, different elements are required to satisfy each.33  If either
of the exceptions applies, evidence obtained in violation of the
knock and announce rule is then admissible.
Chief Justice Burger, in Nix v. Williams, stated that “[t]he
independent source [exception] allows the admission of evidence
by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.”34  To
prevail under this exception, the government must prove that evi-
dence discovered during or as a consequence of an illegal search
was later obtained from an independent lawful source.35  In con-
trast, the inevitable discovery exception provides that illegally ob-
tained evidence may be admitted if the government proves that the
29. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984).
30. Id. at 443.  Prosecutors would be able to convict based upon illegally obtained
evidence.
31. See supra note 25.
32. Nix, 467 U.S. at 431; Dice, 200 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000).
33. Nix, 467 U.S. at 459.
34. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added).
35. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).  In Murray, federal agents inves-
tigated the defendant who they suspected was conducting illegal drug activities out of a
warehouse.  The federal agents illegally searched the warehouse and found several
bales of marijuana.  The agents then obtained a search warrant upon an affidavit that
did not refer to what they had seen in the warehouse and seized the bales of marijuana.
At trial, the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment was denied and the defendant was convicted. The court stated that the
independent source exception precluded the suppression of evidence because it was
later discovered pursuant to a valid warrant not based upon the illegal search.  How-
ever, the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether the federal agents
would have sought a warrant absent the illegal search to ensure that the warrant was
genuinely independent.  This exemplifies that the evidence must be obtained by means
independent of the illegality.
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evidence would have been obtained pursuant to an independent un-
tainted investigation.36  Both exceptions ensure that the govern-
ment is put in the same, not a worse, position than that in which it
would have been absent a constitutional violation.37  Suppressing
such evidence would unfairly disadvantage the government because
the prosecution could not introduce the evidence at trial even
though it would have been obtained constitutionally.38
The facts of Nix v. Williams illustrate the appropriate applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception.  In Nix, while some po-
lice officers were searching an area close to where a young girl’s
body eventually was found, other police officers were driving the
defendant to the police station.39  The police officers escorting the
defendant elicited statements from him that led to the discovery of
the young girl’s body, which ended the search by the other police
officers.40  The defendant was convicted based upon evidence of
the condition of the young girl’s body.41  The defendant later chal-
lenged his conviction, arguing that the evidence of the victim’s
body should have been suppressed because it was obtained ille-
gally.42  The defendant claimed that the body was discovered as a
result of his statements, which were improperly obtained because
he was represented by counsel and should not have been ques-
tioned without his attorney present.  Agreeing that his statements
had been obtained unconstitutionally, the Supreme Court held that
the evidence of the victim’s body nonetheless was properly admit-
ted because it inevitably would have been discovered in the separate
police search.43  Thus, suppressing the evidence would unfairly dis-
advantage the government because the body would have been dis-
covered absent the defendant’s statements.44
Nix v. Williams highlights the difference between the indepen-
dent source exception and the inevitable discovery exception.
36. United States v. Leake, 95 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 1996); Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.  The
government has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
37. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443.
38. Id. at 435.
39. Id. at 436.
40. Id. at 436-37.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 441.
43. Nix, 467 U.S. at 449-50.
44. Id.
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Under both exceptions, there are two investigations that could po-
tentially yield evidence.  In one investigation, evidence is discovered
in violation of the Constitution.  In the second investigation under
the independent source exception, the evidence is also seized
through a wholly independent and constitutional source; whereas
in the second investigation under the inevitable discovery excep-
tion, the evidence would have been seized through a wholly indepen-
dent and constitutional investigation.  In Nix, the court correctly
applied the inevitable discovery exception and admitted evidence
of the victim’s body because it would have been found in the sepa-
rate, untainted police search of the area.  In contrast, United States v.
Langford misapplies the inevitable discovery exception by admitting
evidence that was obtained in the same, tainted investigation.
III. UNITED STATES V. LANGFORD
In United States v. Langford, the Seventh Circuit applied the in-
evitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule in such a man-
ner that the exception swallowed the knock and announce rule.
The court held that when police officers conduct a search pursuant
to a warrant, the fruits of the search may be allowed into evidence,
notwithstanding a violation of the knock and announce rule.45
Since the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant, the court
reasoned that absent the illegality—-violating the knock and an-
nounce rule—-the search would have yielded the same evidence.46
Thus, the police are not required to follow the knock and an-
nounce rule in any case where they have a warrant.
The facts of Langford were as follows: in December of 2000,
Detective Luke Schmitt received information that drugs were being
sold from the defendant’s residence.  Over the next twelve weeks,
Detective Schmitt observed the residence and collected facts suffi-
cient to establish probable cause.47  He then secured a warrant to
search the defendant’s residence for drugs and weapons.48  On the
morning of March 27, 2001, Detective Schmitt executed the war-
45. United States v. Langford, No. IP01-0050-CR-01-T/F, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24509  (S.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2001).
46. Id. at *3-*4.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *8-*9.
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rant with the assistance of the Special Weapons and Tactics
(“S.W.A.T.”) team.49  Detective Schmitt, who was in an armored ve-
hicle in close proximity to the defendant’s bedroom window, an-
nounced three times over a loudspeaker that the officers were there
to execute a search warrant.50  The announcement took ten to fif-
teen seconds and “shortly, if not immediately, thereafter, [the]
S.W.A.T. team officers near the rear of the house detonated a loud
flash-bang device.”51  The police again announced their presence
and purpose for seeking entry.52  When the occupants of the house
did not respond, the officers broke down the front door and en-
tered and searched the residence.53  The police officers discovered
a handgun, and the defendant was subsequently charged with being
a felon in unlawful possession of a handgun.54
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun on the
ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.55  In par-
ticular, the defendant argued the officers violated the knock and
announce rule because they did not knock on the door or wait a
reasonable amount of time between announcing their presence
and entering his residence.56  The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana held that the police officers did
not violate the knock and announce rule and denied the motion to
suppress the gun.57  According to the court, “the fact that the of-
ficers did not physically knock on the door before entering [the
residence] is of no significance” because the Fourth Amendment
49. Id. at *9-*10 (“The SWAT team was called to assist in serving the search war-
rant because Schmitt had information that the occupants of 45 South Iris were
armed”).
50. Id. at *10.
51. Id. at *10-*11.
52. Id. at *11.
53. Id. at *11.
54. Id. at *2. The defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which specifically
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . . to ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
55. Langford, No. IP01-0050-CR-01-T/F, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24509, at *12.
56. Id. at *13.
57. Id. at *64.
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requires only that the officers announce their presence and pur-
pose.58  The court further stated that the officers waited a reasona-
ble amount of time before entering the defendant’s house given
the period of time that elapsed between the first announcement,
the blast, the second announcement, and the noise of the battering
ram smashing against the front door.59  The court considered two
additional factors.  First, there was an increased risk to law enforce-
ment officials because it was likely the occupants of the house were
armed.  Second, the suspects might have destroyed evidence if the
officers waited any longer before they entered the house.60
The defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing inter
alia that the police officers violated the knock and announce rule,
requiring suppression of the gun.61  Writing for the court, Judge
Posner concluded that it was irrelevant whether the knock and an-
nounce rule was violated since a violation of the rule does not re-
quire the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant.62
Judge Posner reasoned that the inevitable discovery exception al-
lows evidence seized in unlawful searches to be admitted at trial if
the police would have discovered such evidence had they obeyed
the law.63  The court concluded that once the police obtained a
search warrant, any evidence on the premises inevitably would have
been discovered in executing the warrant.64  In this case, even if
they followed the knock and announce rule, the police would have
discovered the gun because they had a search warrant.65  The court
further stated that the purpose of the inevitable discovery exception
58. Id.
59. Id. at *66-67.
60. Id. at *68-*69.
61. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 893 (7th Cir. 2002).
62. Id.  In a departure from the judiciary’s traditional conservatism, the court de-
cided this case on an issue not put before them.  The issue before the court was
whether the knock and announce rule was violated.  The court instead found that the
inevitable discovery exception applied, although the issue was not raised by either party.
Thus the police officers did not have to comply with the knock and announce rule for
the evidence to be admitted.
63. Id. at 895.
64. Id. at 894.  The court, citing United States v. Jones, reasoned that “it is hard to
understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevita-
ble’ once the police arrive with a warrant.” Id. at 894.
65. Id. at 895.
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is to prevent the exclusionary rule from “over deter[ring]”66  Specif-
ically the court stated that:
The fruits of an unlawful search are not excludable if it is
clear that the police would have discovered those fruits
had they obeyed the law. That is the “inevitable discovery”
rule . . . without it the exclusionary remedy would over
deter; and it is fully applicable here.  Armed with a valid
search warrant, the police in our case would have discov-
ered the defendant’s gun even if they had given him
enough time to answer their knock before they broke the
front door down.67
The court also stated that the exclusionary rule was not necessary to
deter police from violating the Constitution because 42 U.S.C.
§ 198368 and the Bivens doctrine69 provide adequate remedies for a
violation of the knock and announce rule.70  Thus, the court held
that the gun was admissible.71
The court concluded that the knock and announce rule was
not intended to protect individuals against searches or to exclude
evidence seized during those searches.72  Specifically the court
stated that:
[T]he knock-and-announce rule is not intended to pro-
tect people against being subjected to searches or to limit
the obtaining of evidence by means of searches; it is not a
rule that, like the Fourth Amendment itself, is intended
to provide a privilege to withhold evidence. Therefore
there is no logic to using it to exclude evidence obtained
by a search.73
66. Id.
67. Langford, 314 F.3d at 895 (citations omitted).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows damages against officials who, acting under color of
state law, violate a person’s constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
69. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (allowing monetary damages against federal officials for the violation of a
constitutional right).
70. Langford, 314 F.3d at 895.
71. Id. at 895.  In Langford, the appropriate remedy would have been a § 1983
claim because state officials allegedly violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.  A
Bivens claim would be appropriate if federal officials had violated the Fourth
Amendment.
72. Id. at 895.
73. Id. at 895.
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The court, however, provided no support for these statements.
IV. EVISCERATING THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE RULE
The court in United States v. Langford made several grievous er-
rors.  First, the court incorrectly applied the inevitable discovery ex-
ception.  Second, the court inaccurately characterized the policies
underlying the inevitable discovery exception and the knock and
announce rule.  Moreover, the court removed the incentive for po-
lice officers to comply with the knock and announce rule, which
undermines the protections the knock and announce rule is meant
to provide.74  Finally, the court suggested alternate remedies that
are illusory.  In sum, Langford eviscerated the knock and announce
rule as applied to searches pursuant to a warrant.75
The Seventh Circuit erroneously applied the inevitable discov-
ery exception to the exclusionary rule because it failed to examine
whether the gun would have been inevitably discovered in a sepa-
rate, untainted investigation.  Assuming arguendo, that the defen-
dant’s gun was found in violation of the knock and announce
rule,76 the remedy for such a violation would be suppression of the
74. The holding in United States v. Langford is drastic in its effect on the knock and
announce rule.  This is evidenced by the split between the Seventh Circuit’s opinion
and Judge Evans’ opinion in response to Langford’s petition for rehearing en banc:
Although I have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, I do so
without full confidence in the panel’s conclusion that a violation of the
“knock-and-announce” rule can never, under any circumstances, support a
challenge to a search under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Langford, 60 Fed. 621 (7th Cir. 2003).
75. U.S. v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he requirement that of-
ficers reasonably wait is a crucial element of the knock-and-announce rule. To remove
the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce violation whenever officers
possess a valid warrant would in one swift move gut the constitution’s regulation of how
officers execute such warrants.”).
76. The court did not examine whether the knock and announce rule was violated
because it simply looked at the warrant to apply the inevitable discovery exception.
However, the district court found that the knock and announce rule was not violated
under the totality of the circumstances.  The district court’s opinion is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).  In
Banks the police forcibly entered Banks’ home fifteen to twenty seconds after they
knocked and announced their presence.  The court held that the knock and announce
rule was not violated because fifteen to twenty seconds was a reasonable amount of time
to wait when the police believed there was a threat that the evidence would be de-
stroyed.  Here, the Seventh Circuit could have decided that the knock and announce
rule was not violated and therefore the evidence was admissible instead of drastically
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gun.77  The gun, however, would be admissible if it would inevitably
have been obtained from another lawful source.78  In Langford,
there was no separate lawful source.79  Therefore, the inevitable dis-
covery exception was inapplicable.
The court also mischaracterized the policy underlying the inev-
itable discovery exception.  The court stated the exception is to pre-
vent the exclusionary rule from “over deter[ring].”80  However, in
Nix v. Williams, where the inevitable discovery exception was first
enunciated, the Supreme Court stated that the policy for the excep-
tion is to prevent the government from being placed in a worse
position than it would have been absent any police misconduct.81
Thus, an exception to the exclusionary rule should allow the gov-
ernment to use evidence that it obtained or would have obtained
legally through a separate search, instead of permitting it to use
evidence that was the result of an unlawful search that—-had it
been conducted lawfully—-would have also yielded the evidence.
The court’s misapplication of the inevitable discovery excep-
tion eliminates the incentive for police officers to comply with the
knock and announce rule.  According to the court’s analysis, evi-
dence obtained pursuant to a warrant is admissible irrespective of
whether police officers comply with the knock and announce rule.
The police accordingly have no meaningful incentive to comply
with the rule when they have a warrant.82  Moreover, there are alter-
natives to the knock and announce rule, such as the “sneak and
peak”83 or “no-knock”84 warrant, so there is no need for the court
to eliminate the incentive for police to follow the rule.
changing the dynamic between the knock and announce rule, the exclusionary rule,
and the inevitable discovery exception.
77. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 314 (1958); Dice, 200 F.3d at 982.
78. See discussion supra Section II; see also United States v. Leake, 95 F.3d 409, 412
(6th Cir. 1996); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
79. Langford, 314 F.3d at 895.
80. Id.
81. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
82. See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he knock-and-
announce rule would be meaningless since an officer could obviate illegal entry in every
instance simply by looking to the information used to obtain the warrant. Officers, in
executing a valid search warrant, could break in doors of private homes without
sanction.”).
83. The “sneak and peak” warrant allows government officials to conduct a search
without notice to the individual.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
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In Langford, the court also undermines the policies behind the
knock and announce rule.85  When a police officer barges into
someone’s home uninvited and without notice, there is an in-
creased potential for violence, which is precisely what the knock
and announce rule seeks to prevent.86  There are a myriad of mea-
sures that individuals may take to protect themselves from an unex-
pected intruder which may threaten the safety of both police
officers and occupants.87  This is illustrated by the injuries, and
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3103a
(2001).  The USA Patriot Act specifically states:
§ 3103a.  Additional grounds for issuing warrant
(a) In general. In addition to the grounds for issuing a warrant in sec-
tion 3103 of this title, a warrant may be issued to search for and seize
any property that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation
of the laws of the United States.
(b) Delay. With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order
under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any
property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in
violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that
may be required, to be given may be delayed if—
(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing   im-
mediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an
adverse result . . .;
(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any
wire or electronic communication . . . or . . . any stored wire or
electronic information, except where the court finds reasonable
necessity for the seizure; and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a rea-
sonable period of its execution, which period may thereafter be
extended by the court for good cause shown.
Although the USA Patriot Act was enacted in response to the events of September 11, it
is being used in regular criminal prosecutions. See generally John W. Whitehead &
Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional
Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM.
U.L. REV. 1081 (2002).
84. A “no-knock” warrant allows police officers to enter a home without knocking
and announcing their presence.
85. See discussion supra Section I.
86. See supra note 16. See also Irma S. Raker, The New “No Knock” Provision and its
Effect on the Authority of the Police to Break and Enter, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 469 (1970-71)
(“The policy reasons underlying the announcement rule were to prevent sudden, unan-
nounced invasions of the privacy of citizens . . . to safeguard the officer who might
otherwise be killed by a ‘fearful householder’ unaware of the officer’s identity or
purpose.”).
87. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 69 (1998) (defendant fired a gun
because he thought his home was being burglarized when, in fact, police where execut-
ing a warrant).
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even deaths, that have occurred when police officers attempt to
serve “no knock” warrants.88  For example, police officers in Seattle
entered a home without first knocking and announcing their pres-
ence; thus, they did not give the suspect an opportunity to surren-
der.89  The suspect was shot seven times and subsequently died.90  It
may be argued that “no knock” warrants are typically issued when
there is a reasonable suspicion that suspects are armed and there
already exists an increased potential for violence.  However, con-
sider the case in New York, where an elderly woman died of a heart
attack when police entered her apartment without first knocking
and announcing their presence.91  In that case, a fatality occurred
because a “no knock” warrant was executed with the assumption
that there was an increased potential for violence when in fact none
existed.  Such cases demonstrate that removing the incentive for
police officers to comply with the knock and announce rule is dan-
gerous to both occupants and police officers.
The probability that property will be destroyed is also signifi-
cantly increased if the police do not knock, announce their pres-
ence, and wait a reasonable amount of time for someone to
respond before breaking down the door.92 Langford perfectly illus-
trates this point because while the officers attempted to adhere to
the knock and announce rule, the presence of armored vehicles on
the property and the use of bombs and battering rams eventually
led to the destruction of property.93  In general, forcible entries are
likely to result in the destruction of property.
Lastly, it is well established that individuals have a right to pri-
vacy in their home.94  The Supreme Court has recognized this right
88. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 83 (“A legion of tragic incidents resulting
from execution of “no-knock warrants” demonstrate the potential dangers inherent in
serving such warrants.”).
89. Jennifer Sullivan & Christopher Schwarzen, Family Seeks Inquest in Fatal Shooting
of Fugitive by Police: Snohomish Medical Examiner Says Office has no Jurisdiction Over McCord
Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at B1.
90. Id.
91. See William Glaberson, Two Suits Filed Over Police No-Knock Raids at Wrong
Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 11, 2003, at B2.
92. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927 (1995).
93. Langford, 314 F.3d 892.
94. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).  The Court stated:
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to privacy and has been reluctant to intrude upon it.95  However, if
police officers are allowed to enter a home without notice, an occu-
pant may be confronted with strangers while performing familial,
religious, intimate, or otherwise private undertakings.96  This point
is illustrated in United States v. Banks, where police officers knocked
and announced their presence, but entered after only fifteen to
twenty seconds following their announcement.97  Once inside the
house, police officers found Banks “obviously” emerging from a
shower.98
In addition to undermining the policies underlying the knock
and announce rule, the rule as articulated in Langford may also
breed distrust of law enforcement officials.  Because Langford elimi-
nates the incentive for police officers to adhere to the knock and
announce rule, it creates a risk that police officers will no longer
adhere to the rule.  If police officers fail to follow the knock and
announce rule, society may view this as a blatant disregard for indi-
vidual rights and the rule of law.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit stated that it is not necessary to
exclude evidence to deter police officers from violating the knock
and announce rule because § 1983 and Bivens provide defendants
It is thus perfectly clear that the evil the [Fourth] Amendment was designed
to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant . . . Almost a
century ago the Court stated in resounding terms that the principles re-
flected in the Amendment “reached farther than the concrete form” of the
specific cases that gave it birth, and “apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes [sic] of the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life.”
Id. (citations omitted).
See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“[W]e do not think [state statutes]
reach into the privacy of one’s own home . . . a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”) (empha-
sis added).
95. See generally Payton, 445 U.S. at 573; Stanley, 394 U.S. at 557.
96. Payton, 445 U.S. at 617 (White, J., dissenting) (“The knock-and-announce
[rule] . . . protect[s] individuals against the fear, humiliation, and embarrassment of
being roused from their beds in states of . . . undress.  [It] allow[s] the arrestee to
surrender at his front door, thereby maintaining his dignity and preventing the officers
from entering other rooms of the dwelling.”).
97. 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).
98. Id.; Laura Loh, On the Law; Seconds Make a Difference With Search Warrants, L.A
TIMES, May 3, 2002, at 2 (“Officers found [Banks] in the hallway, naked and soapy.”).
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with sufficient remedies.99  There is, however, no empirical evi-
dence suggesting that civil suits against law enforcement officials
effectively deter Fourth Amendment violations.  Moreover, plain-
tiffs who bring civil suits face numerous obstacles.  First, jurors tend
to favor police and are therefore unlikely to award damages for con-
stitutional violations even when such violations result in serious
physical injury or substantial property damage.100  Second, police
officers can seek qualified immunity, effectively raising the standard
of liability.101  Last, defendants often lack the resources necessary to
pursue civil litigation because there is no right to counsel in civil
cases102 and private lawyers are typically reluctant to pursue hard-to-
win cases on a contingency basis.103  Criminal defendants are there-
fore, unlikely to bring a § 1983 or Bivens claim.
It may be argued that as a matter of good practice, police of-
ficers would still knock and announce their presence prior to enter-
ing a home.  However, it is insufficient to leave the decision to
uphold the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures to the discretion of law enforcement officials.
Warrants require the signature of a neutral and detached judge so
99. Langford, 314 F.3d at 895.  The court lumps together remedies against both
federal and state officials.  The remedies, however, are significantly different and diffi-
cult to obstain.
100. Tara L. Senkel, Note, Civilians Often Need Protection From the Police:  Let’s Hand-
cuff Police Brutality, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 385, 403-04 (1999) (“[P]olice officers are
often viewed by jurors as being credible witnesses because of the position they hold”)
(citations omitted).
101. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999).
102. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981).
103. See Drew C. Phillips, Contingency Fees: Rules and Ethical Guidelines, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 233, 237 (1998).
When determining whether a contingent fee arrangement is appropriate,
“the lawyer should evaluate (1) the likelihood of a favorable outcome,
[and] (2) the time frame in which the recovery is likely to occur.”  So, in
theory, if a lawyer takes a case on a contingent basis, the client should feel
comfortable that the lawyer will work efficiently and diligently, and that
there is a reasonable probability of a successful outcome.
Id. (citations omitted).
See also Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Dis-
contents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 472 (1998) (“Where receipts come from the contin-
gency fee, the effort is to secure the fee with a minimum investment of resources . . . the
plaintiffs’ firm seeks early resolution, minimum investment of time, and use of the low-
est cost workers.”).
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that the interests of the government in obtaining evidence and en-
forcing the law are balanced against individual rights.104  Following
the same logic, the decision to knock and announce should not be
left in the hands of law enforcement agents who are bound to con-
sider crime detection more important than the Fourth Amendment
rights of individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s application of the inevitable discovery
exception in United States v. Langford should not be adopted.  In
analyzing whether the inevitable discovery exception to the exclu-
sionary rule applied, the court only considered whether the search
was pursuant to a warrant.  The court held that the evidence seized
in the search was admissible simply because the search was pursuant
to a warrant.105  In applying the inevitable discovery exception in
this manner, the court removed the incentive for police officers
with a warrant to comply with the knock and announce rule since
any evidence found will be admissible as a result of the police hav-
ing obtained the warrant.  The court’s application is also inconsis-
tent with the policies underlying the knock and announce rule and
the exclusionary rule.  Therefore, if a court finds that there has
been a violation of the knock and announce rule, it should apply
the inevitable discovery exception to admit evidence obtained only
if the evidence would have been discovered through a wholly sepa-
rate search.
104. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
[T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered
to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the
Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and
others who may happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches
is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance
upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the ex-
citement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.
Id.
105. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002).
